

The Sevilla Commitment: What comes next?

The unfinished business of the Fourth International Conference on Financing for Development

by Jens Martens

From 30 June to 3 July 2025, the Fourth International Conference on Financing for Development (FfD4) took place in Sevilla, Spain. According to the United Nations (UN) Member States, the conference was designed to assess progress and obstacles in implementing the decisions of the three previous conferences in Monterrey (2002), Doha (2008) and Addis Ababa (2015), as well as agreeing on measures and initiatives to overcome the obstacles and address new challenges in light of current global crises. The main goal was to accelerate the implementation of the 2030 Agenda and its Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) and to support reforms in the international financial architecture.

The official outcome of the FfD4 conference is the [Sevilla Commitment](#) (Compromiso de Sevilla). The 42-page document is intended to set out the global framework for development financing in the years to come. Given the geopolitical conflicts, the fact that the Sevilla Commitment was adopted by consensus is, in itself, a notable achievement. This was only possible because the US withdrew from the process on the final day of preparations and decided not to participate in the Sevilla conference.

The governments' goal in Sevilla was to launch an ambitious package to reform the international financial architecture, to close the estimated US\$ 4 trillion annual financing gap for the SDGs, and to boost large-scale investment in sustainable development, among other things. However, the Sevilla Commitment falls short of this ambition, with outcomes that remain largely vague and non-binding.

The Commitment does include some concrete tasks and outlines political processes requiring future action by Member States. In addition, the UN has launched the [Sevilla Platform for Action \(SPA\)](#) to complement the Sevilla Commitment. This brings together more than 130 initiatives from coalitions of like-minded countries, UN institutions and non-state actors that support the implementation of the Sevilla decisions and go beyond them.

This briefing highlights some of the tangible decisions included in the Sevilla Commitment, beyond diplomatic platitudes. It outlines the tasks that the international community must tackle in the next few years in order to meet the self-imposed goal of advancing the financing of the 2030 Agenda, implementing structural reforms in the international financial architecture and strengthening inclusive multilateralism under the umbrella of the UN.

The claim: a renewed global framework for development financing

The decision to hold a Fourth International Conference on Financing for Development (FfD4) was long overdue. Ten years have passed since the FfD3 conference in Addis Ababa, and the conditions for

development have deteriorated significantly for many countries since then. The purpose of the FfD4 conference in the Sevilla Commitment was outlined by governments as follows:

“We are meeting at a time of profound transformation, serious geopolitical tensions, conflicts, increasing macroeconomic challenges, and growing systemic risks. Progress in achieving sustainable development in its economic, social, and environmental dimensions is severely off track. We are running out of time to achieve our goals and to address the adverse impacts of climate change. Despite significant efforts by the international community to respond to recent multiple interlinked global challenges, the gap between our sustainable development aspirations and financing to meet them has continued to widen, particularly in developing countries, reaching an estimated 4 trillion United States dollars annually.” (para. 4)

As a consequence, participating governments announced they would “launch an ambitious package of reforms and actions to close this financing gap with urgency and catalyse sustainable development investments at scale” (para. 6).

However, the decisions across the seven areas of action in the Sevilla Commitment fall short of these ambitions, remaining largely vague and non-binding.

Representatives of civil society organizations (CSOs) expressed their disappointment in their

1. Domestic public resources

Domestic tax revenues are by far the most important source of financing for sustainable development. However, weak fiscal systems, harmful tax competition and massive tax evasion and avoidance continue to prevent the effective mobilization and use of public resources. The Sevilla Commitment calls on ‘development partners’ (i.e., donor governments and international organizations) **to at least double their support for domestic revenue mobilization in countries of the Global South by 2030** (para. 27n).

In addition, governments made a commitment to participate constructively in negotiations on a **UN Framework Convention on International Tax Cooperation** and its protocols. **Official negotiations** on this are due to begin in August 2025 and should be completed by the end of 2027 (para. 28b).

In order to increase transparency in the area of corporate taxation, the rules for country-by-country

Declaration from the FfD4 Civil Society Forum, which took place alongside the main conference in Sevilla on 28–29 June 2025. In it, they state: “Civil society remains deeply concerned about the lack of political will for bold reforms and the blocking of any real progress in the negotiations”. Particularly severe is the resistance to reforming the international debt architecture and the governance system of development cooperation.

Even though no major breakthroughs were achieved in Sevilla, the outcome document does contain some concrete decisions and starting points for continuing the FfD agenda. In addition, a number of interesting initiatives were announced as part of the **Sevilla Platform for Action (SPA)**. These now need to be implemented.

Finally, numerous proposals and demands – particularly in the area of global norm setting and reform of the international financial architecture – remain relevant and should be pursued further, even if no consensus was reached on them in Sevilla.

Below, we list some of the important decisions, initiatives and further action needed for the FfD process over the coming years, based on the seven areas of action outlined in the Sevilla Commitment.

reporting are to be strengthened by further examining the creation of a **central public database for country-by-country reports** (para. 28f).

In order to obtain more information about the beneficial owners of companies and assets, effective **domestic beneficial ownership registries** are to be established (para. 28g).

Political dialogue on **combating illicit financial flows** is to be strengthened by the United Nations Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) holding regular special meetings on financial integrity (ECOSOC special meeting on financial integrity) (para. 29c).

No progress was made in the final document on the proposals for taxing the ultra-rich (**billionaire tax**) and for innovative financing instruments, such as **global solidarity levies**, which had been hotly debated in the run-up to the summit. The final document merely contains a vague commit-

ment to “enhance efforts to address tax evasion and avoidance by high-net-worth individuals and ensure their effective taxation, supported by international cooperation, while respecting national sovereignty” (para. 27e).

In addition, several initiatives listed under the **Sevilla Platform for Action (SPA)** include:

» **The Global Solidarity Levies Task Force:** It was already launched at the COP28 climate conference in 2023 and is led by Barbados, France and Kenya. As a specific new action, the following announcement is included on the **SPA website**: “Launch of coalitions of states willing to announce coordinated implementation of global solidarity levies by COP30 in Belém. In Sevilla, countries will announce the formation of coalition(s) and commit to work towards COP30. During the five months from Sevilla to Belém, and with the support of the Global Solidarity Levies Secretariat, members of the coalition will refine their proposal(s) and interact with representatives from all stakeholders. In Belém, members of the coalition will announce their commitments, the timeframe for their implementation, and the modalities for the use of their proceeds.”

» **‘Taxing the super-rich’:** This initiative by the finance ministries of Brazil and Spain aims to achieve progress through coordinated international action on the taxation of the ‘super-rich’. The initiative identifies the following four areas for action:

- Build political synergies on international cooperation related to the taxation of high-net-worth individuals across different multilateral fora
- Promote and facilitate implementation of evidence-based reforms on the taxation of high-net-worth individuals across different countries
- Strengthen regional coordination of taxation of high-net-worth individuals

- Provide a platform for peer review on existing practices and opportunities to explore solutions further and deliver coordinated actionable progress.

» **The 3 by 35 Initiative:** Launched by the World Health Organization (WHO), this initiative proposes raising the real prices of three products that are harmful to health – tobacco, alcohol and sugary drinks – by at least 50 percent by 2035 through tax increases. The aim is to reduce consumption of these products and generate an additional US\$ 1 trillion in public revenue worldwide over the next 10 years. According to the WHO, a recent analysis suggests that a one-time tax increase sufficient to raise prices by 50 percent could generate up to US\$ 3.7 trillion in new revenue worldwide within five years, or an average of US\$ 740 billion per year – equivalent to 0.75 percent of global Gross Domestic Product (GDP).

However, the chapter on domestic public resources is not only about revenue, but also about expenditure and the use of public funds. It expressly emphasizes the promotion of **gender-responsive budgeting** (para. 27g). This shows that the US was unable to push through its demand to remove the term “gender” from the document.

The **financing of social security systems** is also highlighted. Countries in the Global South are to be supported in expanding social protection coverage for their populations. This particularly applies to countries that have adopted the target set by the International Labour Organization (ILO) to increase the proportion of the population with access to at least one element of social security by at least two percentage points per year. To this end, an initiative entitled “Financing social protection: From pledge to practice” was presented under the auspices of Mexico, Qatar, the ILO and the Global Partnership for Universal Social Protection to Achieve the Sustainable Development Goals (**USP2030**) as part of the Sevilla Platform for Action. The topic will also play an important role at **the second World Social Summit**, which is due to take place in Doha, Qatar, from 4–6 November 2025.

2. Domestic and international private business and finance

In view of the growing gap between global financial needs and shrinking official development assistance (ODA) (see below), governments of the Global North in particular emphasized the impor-

tance of private capital for promoting sustainable development in the preparations for FfD4. The Sevilla Commitment contains numerous recommendations on this issue, most of which are high-

ly appealing. In particular, they aim to create an enabling environment for domestic and foreign investment and to mobilize private capital, including through *blended finance*.

The Sevilla Platform for Action lists 81 initiatives in this area, more than for any of the other seven action areas. One example is the **SCALED – Scaling Capital for Sustainable Development** initiative, which was launched by Germany, Denmark, France, Canada, the United Kingdom and South Africa in cooperation with major insurance companies such as AXA, Allianz and Zurich Insurance. Its goal is to develop and promote new *blended finance* instruments.

In the Sevilla Commitment, governments also emphasize the promotion of foreign direct investment (FDI) in poorer countries. In this context, they support the establishment of an **International Investment Support Centre** for the least developed countries (LDCs), which had already been **decided at the LDC5 Conference in 2023**. In addition, they announce that they will consider creating an **Infrastructure Investment Finance Facility** for landlocked developing countries. Finally, they welcome the establishment of a **Small Island Developing States Centre of Excellence**, which will, among other things, organize an **Island Investment Forum** every two years (para. 31b). The **initiative** to establish such a centre dates back to 2015.

3. International development cooperation and development effectiveness

International development cooperation – and in particular the ODA provided by members of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD)'s Development Assistance Committee (DAC) – remains an essential component of the FfD agenda. This makes the downward trend in ODA worldwide all the more alarming. In the Sevilla Commitment, countries recognize the urgency of reversing this downward trend and reaffirm their 55-year commitment to allocate **0.7 percent of gross national income (GNI) to ODA** (para. 36b).

However, representatives from the Global South and many civil society organizations perceive this commitment as hypocritical, as the budget plans for the coming years in many donor countries out-

The decisions on private financing were met with harsh criticism at the FfD4 Civil Society Forum. **The forum's declaration** states:

“We remain deeply concerned with the central role that private finance has taken over the course of FfD negotiations ... The ‘private finance first’ approach has failed to deliver on its promises and remains woefully inadequate to deliver sustainable development outcomes, to protect peoples’ rights to basic services and the environment. ... Regarding ‘innovative’ financing instruments, such as blended finance, PPPs, bonds, debt swaps and guarantees, we see that they divert already scarce public resources that should support much-needed universal and high-quality public services, are more expensive and risky for the public purse and for the people, increasing public debt as well as ultimately private/household debt.”

Instead, civil society organizations called on governments to make a clear commitment to the initiative for a legally binding agreement under international law that regulates the activities of transnational corporations in accordance with human rights. Negotiations on such a **‘Binding Treaty’** have been ongoing for 10 years under the chairmanship of Ecuador in an intergovernmental working group of the UN Human Rights Council. Although it is not part of the FfD process, it is directly related to efforts to align private investment with SDGs. The **11th round of negotiations** of the working group will take place in Geneva in October 2025. The Sevilla Commitment does not mention this process.

line drastic cuts. This applies not only to the US but also to most European countries, including the United Kingdom, France and Germany. In order to regain credibility with the Global South, these cuts must be urgently reversed in line with the Sevilla Commitment.

According to the OECD, ODA fell by 7.1 percent in real terms in 2024. Even more drastic cuts are expected for 2025 and beyond unless radical countermeasures are taken. There are concerns that these cuts may force many countries in the Global South to implement austerity measures.

In the run-up to Sevilla, G77 countries and civil society organizations called for the opposite approach. They advocated for enshrining ODA in

law to make the longstanding 0.7 percent target more binding and move beyond mere lip service. In the preparatory process, [Zambia for example proposed](#):

“Agree on a **UN Convention on International Development Cooperation**, including establishing a mechanism for the fulfillment of the trillions in unmet ‘aid debt’ owed to the Global South through decades.”

Numerous civil society organizations also spoke out in favour of such a convention in the run-up to the Sevilla conference, including [Eurodad](#).

In a similar vein, many G77 countries are calling for the **‘right to development’** to be enshrined in an internationally binding convention that also includes the **‘duty to cooperate’**. They already introduced a resolution to this effect in the UN Human Rights Council in October 2023, which was adopted by a majority (against the votes of the US and European countries) ([Res. A/HRC/54/L.27](#)). It contains a concrete draft for such a convention in the annex. The next step is for the proposal to be discussed in the UN General Assembly.

More fundamental reform proposals for long-term development financing have been put forward in recent years by proponents of the concept of [Global Public Investment](#) (GPI). They advocate for

a fundamentally new approach to development financing that overcomes the classic donor–recipient relationship by, on the one hand, having all countries contribute to financing and, on the other hand, involving all actors equally in decision-making, especially the countries of the Global South. The focus is on mobilizing public funds to finance global public goods.

In Sevilla, under the slogan “Coalition to Build Support for Global Public Investment: A New Approach to Finance Global Challenges”, various actors – including the Club de Madrid and the Colombian government – have joined forces to establish the **GPI-Sevilla Platform for Action (GPI-SPA)**. A multi-year programme is planned to discuss the GPI concept in global policy dialogues and consultations and to mobilize political support. The pilot model for a GPI fund is to be created in 2026, and a formal proposal to embed GPI into global financial governance structures is to be formulated by 2028.

The **Development Cooperation Forum (DCF)** within the UN could be the appropriate venue for discussing all these issues. It has been held every two years since 2007, but has so far been politically weak. The Sevilla Commitment paves the way towards ‘revitalizing’ the DCF (para. 40d). However, it does not specify how this is to be achieved. [Proposals](#) to this effect have been put forward by civil society for some time.

4. International trade as an engine for development

Trade has traditionally played only a minor role in the FfD process. The countries of the Global North, in particular, insist that decisions on this issue should be taken by the World Trade Organization (WTO). However, as the WTO has been largely incapable of acting for years, trade negotiations have shifted to the bilateral and regional level. In view of the acute protectionist tendencies and unilateral actions in world trade, the Sevilla Commitment calls above all for the strengthening of a “rules-based, non-discriminatory, open, fair, in-

clusive, equitable and transparent multilateral trading system with the World Trade Organization at its core” (para. 43a).

One of the few more concrete decisions in this chapter aims to support efforts to reform the mechanisms for **investor–state dispute settlements** in trade and investment agreements (para. 43l). In this context, there is support for the establishment of an **Advisory Centre on International Investment Dispute Resolution**.

5. Debt and debt sustainability

The debt situation for many countries in the Global South has deteriorated massively over the past decade. “Sovereign debt challenges have become one of the greatest obstacles to realizing sustainable development,” the governments stated in Sevilla (para. 47).

In the negotiations leading up to the conference, there was heated controversy over more binding forms of global debt regulation under the umbrella of the UN. [Pakistan, Egypt and Nigeria](#), for example, called for negotiations on a “multilateral

legal framework for debt restructuring”. They also called for a “multilateral sovereign debt workout mechanism” and the establishment of a “global debt authority” to oversee this mechanism. The demands were supported by the [African Group](#) and the Group of [LDCs](#), among others. However, the proposals were met with harsh rejection by the EU, the UK and the US.

The Sevilla Commitment now contains at least a passing reference to the “review of the sovereign debt architecture” already provided for in the Pact for the Future. It includes the announcement that:

“we will initiate an intergovernmental process at the United Nations, with a view to making recommendations for closing gaps in the debt architecture and exploring options to address debt sustainability” (para 50f).

In addition, the chapter on debt contains a number of decisions that represent at least minimal progress. For example, the UN Secretary-General is called upon to establish a **working group**, together with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank, to formulate proposals for a consolidated set of **voluntary guiding principles on responsible sovereign borrowing and lending** and proposals for their implementation. The [UN Trade and Development \(UNCTAD\) Principles on Promoting Responsible Sovereign Lending and Borrowing](#) are set to form the basis for this, among other things. An interim report by the working group is due to be presented at the FfD Forum in 2026 and the final report will be shared at the FfD Forum in 2027.

In order to strengthen the voice of debtor countries in the global debt architecture, a **Platform for Borrower Countries** is to be established, with the UN acting as the secretariat (para. 48i).

6. International financial architecture and systemic issues

The international financial architecture is suffering from a reform backlog. Key institutions such as the IMF and the World Bank have not been adequately adapted to the evolving global political situation since they were established in 1944 and countries of the Global South remain underrepresented in these institutions. Since the first FfD Conference in Monterrey in 2002, governments have emphasized the need for reforms of global economic governance and enhancing the voice and representation of developing countries in international economic and financial institutions.

A serious problem in managing debt crises is the lack of transparency regarding the debt situation of the countries concerned. This is now to be countered by consolidating existing debt databases into a **Global Central Debt Data Registry** under the umbrella of the World Bank (para. 48c).

In order to be able to respond better to external shocks, such as those resulting from environmental disasters or pandemics, the inclusion of **state-contingent clauses** should be promoted – for example, in the form of climate-resilient debt clauses or debt pause clauses (para. 48d). In this context, a **Debt Pause Clause Alliance** was also formed in Sevilla, in which several multilateral development banks and some creditor countries (Canada, France, Spain and the United Kingdom) committed to including ‘pause clauses’ in their lending to suspend debt service payments during crises.

From the perspective of many CSOs, the Sevilla decisions fall far short of addressing the urgency of global debt problems and the special responsibility of creditor countries. The [FfD4 Civil Society Forum Declaration](#) states:

“We deeply regret to see that creditor countries effectively stripped down the outcome document from its remaining ambition on debt during negotiations, especially in the final stages, only to end by disassociating from para 50 (f) calling on the intergovernmental process.

However, Sevilla is not the end point. We will remain engaged and continue to steadily support the efforts of Global South governments that try to achieve ambitious and positive outcomes on debt towards a comprehensive debt architecture reform through a UN Convention on Sovereign Debt (...).”

In the run-up to the Sevilla conference, the countries of the Global South and CSOs repeatedly called for fundamental reforms of the international financial architecture. Key positions are summarized, for example, in the civil society report of October 2024, [Building new foundations: Reimagining the International Financial Architecture](#).

The Sevilla Commitment barely reflects the demands for fundamental reforms. It mainly contains

appeals and recommendations to the IMF and the World Bank to reform the **voting rights system** – for example, by increasing the basic votes in the IMF’s General Review of Quotas (para. 53b). It also recommends expanding the **executive boards** of international financial institutions, especially the IMF and the World Bank, to increase the share of countries from the Global South (para. 53d). It is noteworthy that the report explicitly calls for gender balance in the executive boards of all international organizations too.

With regard to the allocation of **Special Drawing Rights (SDRs)** by the IMF, the recommendation to richer countries to voluntarily rechannel at least half of their SDRs to countries in the Global South, including through multilateral development banks (MDBs), is merely repeated (para. 54i). In addition, the IMF is invited to design a **Special Drawing Rights playbook** that provides operational guidance and strengthens the role of SDRs during crises and shocks (para. 54j).

With regard to the controversial role of credit rating agencies, the governments in Sevilla were only able to agree to hold regular special high-level meetings of the ECOSOC on the subject (**Special High-level Meeting on Credit Ratings**). Among other things, these meetings are intended to exchange good examples of the regulation of credit rating agencies (para. 55a).

7. Science, technology, innovation and capacity-building

Access to innovative technologies is an important prerequisite for achieving the necessary progress in global eco-social transformation. Against this backdrop, the governments note “with deep concern the deepening gaps in innovation in, production of, and connectivity and access to technology” (para. 58).

However, they do not draw the necessary conclusions from this in the Sevilla Commitment. Instead, they largely limit themselves to confirming existing initiatives and institutions. They declare their increased support for the **Multi-Stakeholder Forum on Science, Technology and Innovation for the SDGs (STI Forum)**, the **UN Commission on Science and Technology for Development (CSTD)** and other international platforms (para. 59o).

In terms of financing, they include commitments to providing adequate resources for the **Technology Facilitation Mechanism** and the **Techno-**

With regard to the risks associated with the activities of financial institutions outside the formal banking sector (non-bank financial institutions) – in particular, the asset management industry – the Financial Stability Board is called upon to formulate policy recommendations to increase the resilience of these institutions (para. 56b). However, this is a recommendation that falls far short of the need for stronger regulation of the shadow banking sector.

Civil society organizations continue to see a significant need for action in reforming the international financial architecture. In the **Declaration of the FfD4 Civil Society Forum**, they identify the following three areas for the FfD process after Sevilla:

- (1) a comprehensive review of the mandates and governance structures of IFIs/MDBs;
- (2) a comprehensive review and reform of the global reserve system, with special attention to the role and issuing modalities of SDRs;
- (3) an Intergovernmental Commission under ECOSOC to regulate, monitor and hold accountable Credit Rating Agencies (CRAs) and explore the establishment of an international public credit agency at the UN, among other reforms.

logy Bank for LDCs – but again on a voluntary basis (para. 59n).

The civil society demand for a **UN intergovernmental Global Technology Assessment Mechanism** was not included in the Sevilla Commitment. It remains on the agenda as a follow up to Sevilla. According to the **FfD4 Civil Society Forum**:

“Such a mechanism should be broad, transparent, inclusive, accessible, and allow for participatory technology risk assessments that involve those who will be impacted by digital technologies – particularly women, workers, peoples with disabilities, and marginalized communities in the Global South. These assessments should occur prior to and during the development and deployment of new technologies, and account for their environmental, social, economic, and human rights impacts.”

Monitoring and follow-up

Two factors were crucial to the success of the FfD4 conference: First, governments should have agreed on verifiable steps to mobilize urgently needed additional financial resources; and they should have initiated overdue structural reforms. This has largely failed to happen. The mere adoption of the Sevilla Commitment has not reduced the SDG financing gap by a single euro; neither has it taken a single tangible step towards reforming the international financial architecture. It has merely produced numerous political statements with varying degrees of commitment. The Sevilla Commitment itself is merely an output of a political process, but not yet a real outcome that would effectively promote sustainable development.

With this in mind, the conference should have agreed on procedures and governance arrangements to monitor and evaluate the implementation of the decisions in the follow-up process. However, here too the status quo was largely confirmed, even though the governments verbally committed themselves in the Sevilla Commitment to strengthening the follow-up process (“Strengthened monitoring and follow-up is vital to ensuring sustained progress on financing for development”, para. 65).

Three bodies continue to be at the heart of the follow-up process:

- » The **ECOSOC Forum on Financing for Development Follow-up**: This meets annually in April for one week to discuss the implementation of the FfD decisions. The FfD Forum is to submit intergovernmental conclusions and recommendations to the High-level Political Forum (HLPF), which monitors the implementation of the 2030 Agenda and its goals. In future, it will address FfD issues in a biennial cycle. In 2026, the agenda will focus on the action areas of private business and finance, trade, international financial architecture and systemic issues, as well as data, monitoring and follow-up. In 2027, the action areas of domestic public resources, international development cooperation, debt, and science and technology will follow.
- » The **Inter-Agency Task Force on Financing for Development (IATF)** will continue to provide Member States with up-to-date data and analysis on development financing. This will be done in the form of the annual Financing for Sustainable Development Report, among other things. The FfD Office within the UN Department

of Economic and Social Affairs (DESA) will act as coordinator of the IATF.

- » The **General Assembly High-level Dialogue on Financing for Development** should continue to be held every four years for one day immediately after the SDG Summit; the next dialogue is due in September 2027.

To strengthen follow-up at the national level, the proposal was made to establish national **FfD focal points** and consider setting up **interministerial FfD platforms** to improve policy coordination.

Governments were unable to agree on further steps to strengthen the UN, in particular its stronger coordination role in the international financial architecture, as called for primarily by the G77.

The **biennial summit** of the UN and international financial institutions (IFIs) proposed by the UN Secretary-General and included in **the Pact for the Future** (action 48) is also not mentioned in the Sevilla Commitment.

However, negotiations, consultations and further conferences on individual aspects of the FfD agenda will be important in the further FfD process. In the near future, these will include, in particular:

- » Negotiations on a **UN Framework Convention on International Tax Cooperation** and its protocols, which will begin in New York in August 2025.
- » Consultations on measures and indicators for sustainable development beyond GDP. UN Secretary-General António Guterres appointed a **high-level panel of experts** on the topic of **“Beyond GDP”** in May 2025. In Sevilla, the **Beyond GDP Global Alliance** was formed to support this effort, with Spain, the OECD and UNCTAD among its members.
- » The **2nd World Summit for Social Development (WSSD2)**, which will take place in Doha, Qatar. Among other things, the agenda will include issues relating to the financing of poverty reduction and social security.

The Sevilla Commitment stipulates that the need for a **further FfD conference (FfD5)** will be discussed in 2029 (para. 65g). Given the substantial tasks that remain, it is already clear that another

conference will be urgently needed. Such a gathering will also play an essential role in shaping discussions and decisions on the **post-2030 agenda**. In an optimistic scenario, the political environment after 2029 may be better for holding this conference than it was for Sevilla in 2025. However, this

does not mean that we should sit back and wait for better times. In the words of **Shari Spiegel**, Director of Sustainable Development Financing at UN DESA: “Sevilla is a moment in time. It is really the beginning, not the end of the process.”

Further Informationen

Financing for Sustainable Development UN website: <https://financing.desa.un.org/>

Website of the FfD4 conference in Sevilla: <https://financing.desa.un.org/ffd4>

Sevilla Commitment: <https://docs.un.org/A/CONF.227/2025/L.1>

Sevilla Platform for Action: <https://financing.desa.un.org/ffd4/sevilla-platform-action>

Declaration from the FfD4 Civil Society Forum:
<https://csoforffd.org/resources/declaration-from-the-ffd4-civil-society-forum>

Website of the Civil Society Financing for Development Mechanism: <https://csoforffd.org/>

Information from the Global Policy Forum Europe on development financing and tax justice:
https://www.globalpolicy.org/en/issues/development_finance_and_tax_justice

Imprint

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Publisher

Global Policy Forum Europe e.V.
Königstr. 37a, 53115 Bonn, Germany
Tel. +49 228 96 50 510
europe@globalpolicy.org
www.globalpolicy.org
Contact: Bodo Ellmers

Author: Jens Martens

Collaboration and editing: Vicky Anning, Bodo Ellmers and Julia Hanne

Design: www.kalinski.media

Bonn, July 2025

This briefing paper is part of the “Sustainable Development Financing” project of Global Policy Forum Europe e.V., funded by the GIZ GmbH on behalf of the German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ).



Global Policy Forum Europe e.V. is solely responsible for the content of this publication; the views expressed herein do not necessarily reflect the views of GIZ or BMZ.